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Abstract
The information security community has long debated the exact defini-
tion of the term ‘security’. Even if we focus on the more specific notion of
confidentiality the precise definition remains controversial. In their seminal
paper [4], Goguen and Meseguer took an important step towards a formal-
isation of the notion of absence of information flow with the concept of
non-interference. This too was found to have problems and limitations, par-
ticularly when applied to systems displaying non-determinism which led to
a proliferation of refinements of this notion and there is still no consensus as
to which of these is ‘correct’.
We show that this central concept in information security is closely re-
lated to a central concept of computer science: that of the equivalence of
systems. The notion of non-interference depends ultimately on our notion
of process equivalence. However what constitutes the equivalence of two
processes is itself a deep and controversial question in computer science
with a number of distinct definitions proposed in the literature. We illustrate
how several of the leading candidates for a definition of non-interference
mirror notions of system equivalence. Casting these security concepts in
a process algebraic framework clarifies the relationship between them and
allows many results to be carried over regarding, for example, composition
and the completeness of unwinding rules.
We also outline some generalisations of a CSP formulation of non-interference
to handle partial and conditional information flows.
1 Introduction
It is a source of mild embarrassment that the information security community has
not yet reached a consensus as to the precise meaning on the term ‘security’ or
even to the simpler question of what is meant by confidentiality. It is clear that
confidentiality boils down to the absence of certain undesirable information flows,
but this begs the question of what constitutes an information flow or its absence.
The thesis of this paper is that the characterisation of the absence of informa-
tion flow is strongly related to characterisations of systems equivalence. The latter
is of course a central concept in computer science and here too we find that there is
no single agreed definition of what constitutes equivalence. Instead we again find
a proliferation of definitions and it seems that which is appropriate depends on
the particular application. We believe that identifying the analogies between the
concepts in the security and the process algebra communities sheds further light
on the notion of confidentiality and in particular helps explain the proliferation of
definitions of confidentiality. Indeed the security community can perhaps derive
some solace from the observation that the problem of defining non-interference is
equivalent in difficulty to one of the central problems of computer science and so
it should not be a source of surprise that consensus has eluded us.
A number of attempts to unify the various formulations of non-interference
have been published recently, notably McLean [11] and Foccardi and Gorrieri
[2]. These are very elegant and illuminating. We will show in detail in the later
sections of this paper that there is a close correspondence between formulations of
non-interference and formulations of process equivalence. It appears that by and
large the proponents of the various forms of non-interference were unaware of the
analogies with notions in the process algebra community and were independently
reinventing these concepts in the security context.
Process algebras, in particular CSP, provide a general framework for describ-
ing interacting systems. Many of the formulations of confidentiality that one finds
in the literature are presented in rather specialised and often specially tailored
models of computation, so recasting them in a process algebra allows them to
be generalised and compared. Another advantage of using a process algebraic
framework is that it allows us to apply a number of established results, such as the
completeness of unwinding rules, and compositionality.
We start with a brief introduction to those aspects of CSP that we use in this
paper, followed by an introduction to non-interference. The next three sections
present the main contribution of the paper: a number of formulations of non-
interference in a CSP style, from the points of view of failures, bisimulation,
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and testing respectively. In Section 7 we discuss some generalisations of non-
interference designed to encompass a richer class of security policies.
2 Process algebra
Process algebras provide a particular approach to the study of concurrency and
interaction. This paper bases its discussion within the framework of the process
algebra CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes). A full account of this pro-
cess algebra can be found in [15, 20]. It provides a language for describing in-
teracting systems, together with a semantic theory for understanding them. This
section provides a brief introduction to those aspects most relevant to this paper.
The language of CSP is constructed around events: instantaneous synchroni-
sations which provide the communication primitive. Events may have some struc-
ture, the most common being a channel communication of the form c v, where c is
the channel name, and v is the value communicated. For the purposes of this paper
we will divide  , the set of all events, into two classes: H (high) and L (low). The
set H will be further divided into high inputs HI and high outputs HO.
Processes are used to describe possible patterns of interaction, in terms of the
events that they may engage in at any particular stage of an execution. In CSP,
a process has an alphabet, or interface: the set of events it is able to synchronise
on. If P already describes a process, then the process cv   P describes another
process which is prepared to output v on channel c, and behave subsequently as P.
If Px is a process for each possible value of x, then the input cx   Px may
take in some value v along channel c and behave subsequently as Pv. Channels
will generally have some type, which is the set of possible messages that can
appear on that channel. The process STOPA has alphabet A and can perform no
events at all. If the alphabet is clear from the context then the subscripted alphabet
may be elided. For example, the process
inx   outx   STOP
is able initially to accept any input along channel in, and then to provide that same
value along channel out, after which it can engage in no further activity.
The choice P u Q may behave non-deterministically either as P or as Q. For
example, the process
out  STOP u out  STOP
can choose to output either a  or a .
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Processes may be put in parallel: P k Q behaves as P running concurrently
with Q, synchronising on events in their common alphabets, and performing other
events independently. An interleaving of two processes, P jjj Q, simply executes
P and Q concurrently without any communication occurring between them. Val-
ues are passed between parallel processes by means of synchronisations on the
channels, linking an output channel of one to an input channel of another. For
example,
inx   mid  x  STOP k midy   out  y  STOP
has its two component processes synchronising on the channel mid. This enables
information to flow from the left-hand process (which outputs a value) to the right-
hand process (which inputs) along channel mid. Any value appearing on out will
be four times a value that has been input on in.
The abstraction mechanism P n A describes the process P with all occur-
rences of A occurring internally in the resulting process. This is different from
P k STOPA, which behaves as the process P with all occurrences of A blocked.
For example,
inx   mid  x  STOP k midy   out  y  STOP n mid Z
will make the mid channel internal.
The process RUNA has alphabet A, and it is always ready to perform any event
from the set A. The process CHAOSA also has alphabet A, and can perform or
refuse to perform any such event at any stage during an execution—it is the most
non-deterministic (divergence-free) process with alphabet A.
Processes may also be recursively defined, by giving equations which contain
the name of the process being defined as a subterm of the process expression. For
example, the process
COPY  inx   outx   COPY
defines a buffer process COPY as one which repeatedly alternates input and out-
put. Indexed processes may also be recursively defined using families of equa-
tions.
The semantics of processes are given in terms of observations. A process is
identified with the set of behaviours that may possibly be observed of it, where
the kind of behaviour considered determines the nature of the model.
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The Traces Model is concerned with the traces of a process: the (finite) se-
quences of events that it can perform during some execution. For example,
tracesCOPY 
fhig
 fhin vi j v  Vg
 fhin v out vi j v  Vg
 fhin v out v in wi j v  Vw  Vg
.
.
.
where V is the type of the channels in, out.
The notation tr   A (pronounced ‘tr project A) denotes the projection of the
trace onto the set A: the maximal subsequence of tr all of whose events are in A.
If tr is a possible trace of a process P, then Ptr (pronounced ‘P after tr’)
denotes the process that P becomes after executing the trace tr. For example,
COPYhin i  out  COPY .
The traces model is sufficient for many applications but it is not able to fully
distinguish different non-deterministic behaviours. To deal with non-determinism
we must turn to the failures model of CSP. A refusal of a process is a set of
events that the process might initially refuse to engage in. For example, the set
fout  out g is a refusal of the process COPY . The set of all refusals of a process
P is denoted refusalsP
In order to consider refusals during an execution, the notion of failure is intro-
duced: a failure of a process is a trace together with a refusal set which describes a
set of events that the process might refuse to engage in after performing the trace.
For example, hin 	i fin 
 in g is a failure of COPY . If trX is a failure of
P, then X is a refusal of Ptr. The most non-deterministic process CHAOSA can
exhibit all possible traces, and all possible refusals:
failuresCHAOSA  ftrX j tr  A   X  Ag
where A  denotes all sequences whose elements are all drawn from A.
A divergence of a process is a trace after which it may perform an infinite
sequence of internal actions. In this paper, we are assuming that the systems
modelled do not diverge.
A process is deterministic whenever, given an arbitrary trace tra hai, it could
not have refused the last event instead of performing it: tr fag should not be
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a failure. Thus given any trace, there is only one possible response for each po-
tential next event. Hence a process is non-deterministic if it has some trace tr
such that tr a hai is a possible trace and tr fag is a possible refusal. In other
words, having performed the trace tr, if an environment offers a then it might non-
deterministically either be accepted or refused. In the failures model a process Q
is a refinement of another process P when the set of Q’s failures are a subset of P’s
failures. This means that Q is more deterministic. Thus CHAOSA is refined by any
process with alphabet A, and deterministic processes cannot be further refined: no
process is a strict refinement of a deterministic process.
Processes are considered equivalent in a semantic model if they have the same
set of behaviours in that model. Thus if P and Q have the same traces, then they
are equivalent in the traces model, written P traces Q. This means that if only
their traces are examined, then they cannot be distinguished. Similarly, if P and
Q have the same failures, then this is written P failures Q. The subscript to the
equality symbol can be dropped if it is clear from the context.
Process semantics may also be described in terms of operational semantics,
which describe transitions between states (process descriptions). Thus P    P
describes the performance by P of a single  event, reaching the state P.  ranges
over visible events (drawn from  ) and the special internal event  . If s is a se-
quence of events, then P s P describes a sequence of steps between successive
processes, each step labelled by the corresponding event in the sequence s. Oper-
ational semantics allows alternative approaches to comparing processes.
Strong bisimulation [12] identifies processes if the states in their execution
graphs match. This will be the case if there is a symmetric bisimulation relation
R such that if PRQ and P    P then Q 	 PRQ  Q    Q, where  is any
transition label, including  s. This is the strongest useful equivalence between
processes, and implies equivalence in any of the CSP semantic models. As well
as requiring traces to match, bisimulation also requires the points at which choices
are made within processes to match.
This can be relaxed by not requiring the two processes to match hidden ( )
events. Here we allow a visible event a in P to be matched by a sequence a, for
some a     a   , the set of all sequences of  actions interleaved with a single a.
For internal events  , we write P   P if there is some n (possibly 0) such that
P 
n
 P. This allows us to define weak-bisimulation.
P and Q are weakly bisimilar with respect to the symmetric relation 
 if and
only if whenever P 
 Q then P    P  Q 	 Q    Q  P 
 Q.
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In [3] Gardiner proposes a further weakening, introducing an equivalence re-
lation on the power set of states, known as power-bisimulation. This allows sets
of states of process P to be related to sets of states of process Q. A relation R
between sets of states is a power-bisimulation if for all      fg and all sets
of states P and Q we have that
PRQ  fP j P
 
 
 P  P  PgRfQ j Q    Q  Q  Qg
This has the effect of abstracting out the effect of the point at which non-
deterministic choices are made. This allows the construction of a form of bisim-
ulation that is precisely equivalent to failures equivalence and will be discussed
more fully in Section 5.
Another approach to comparing processes is in terms of testing. A test T is a
particular kind of process, with some SUCCESS states. We consider the execution
of T in conjunction with a process P and if P k T can reach a success state then
‘P may T’. If P may T whenever Q may T and vice versa for all possible tests T ,
then P and Q are equivalent under may testing. For further information on testing
see [5].
3 Non-interference
Confidentiality policies are concerned with restricting classes of information flows.
In the early days of the subject such policies were typically constructed by anal-
ogy with the paper world and so involved assertions such as: information should
not flow from an object of higher classification to one of lower classification. Thus
information flows are treated in a binary fashion: it is either allowed to flow or not,
and the objects of the policy were typically fairly gross: data bases, files, agents
etc. Such analogies now look rather dated in the light of the capabilities provided
by current information processing systems and we will address the question of
constructing more elaborate policies, with finer granularity of objects and more
subtle controls of information flows, in Section 7. For the moment we will stick
to this traditional viewpoint as, even in this comparatively simple context, there
are a number of subtleties to be considered.
A central problem is to characterise the absence of information flow between
objects, which in effect means across interfaces or along channels. The Bell and
La Padula model takes the notions of read and write as primitives and so makes no
attempt to formalise them. A number of critiques of Bell and La Padula are based
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on this observation. An early attempt to formalise the absence of information flow
was the concept of non-interference proposed in the seminal paper by Goguen and
Meseguer, [4].
Intuitively the idea is as follows: to establish that information does not flow
from object A to object B it is sufficient to establish that A’s behaviour has no
effect on what B can observe. Put differently: B’s view of the system is indepen-
dent of A’s behaviour. This latter suggests an appropriate way of capturing this
mathematically: for any pair of behaviours of the system that differ only in A’s
behaviour, B’s observations of the system cannot distinguish these two systems.
This makes it clear that the notion of indistinguishability of behaviours is central.
For systems that are deterministic it is fairly straightforward to make such equiv-
alence precise and indeed it is deterministic systems that Goguen and Meseguer
originally considered.
We will cast the Goguen/Meseguer formulation into a more CSP like notation
for ease of comparison with later formulations.
Assume that High interacts with the system S via the interface H and Low via
the interface L and further that these two interfaces partition the full interface of
S. Then High is said to be non-interfering with Low via S if:
 tr  I  c  I 	OutputLStr c  OutputLStr   L c (1)
where I is the set of inputs to S, and I  the set of sequences of I’s. OutputLStr c
denotes the output to Low from the system when it is in the state resulting from the
sequence of inputs tr and when it receives a further input c. Finally, the projection
to L (tr   L) is the trace tr with all occurrences of H events removed (given that H
and L partition the alphabet of S).
In other words, whatever inputs High has performed the output that Low sees
is the same as he would see if High had done nothing. Note that for a system in
which the Low output is uniquely determined this equality is straightforward to
define.
Even in this seemingly straightforward definition a number of subtleties lurk,
for example: it depends on drawing a distinction between ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’
without making the semantics of this distinction clear. This is a bit like the failure
of the Bell La Padula model to give a precise semantics to the terms ‘read’ and
‘write’.
More significant is the point that for systems displaying non-determinism
characterising the equality of Equation 1 turns out to be rather delicate. Thus
the seemingly innocent phrase ‘...B’s observations of the system cannot distin-
guish...’ actually conceals some subtle problems. The question of deciding when
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two processes should be regarded as equivalent is a difficult one and one to which
a number of answers have been proposed. It is far from clear which of these is to
be regarded as ‘correct’. Indeed it seems reasonable to suppose that there is in fact
no ‘correct’ notion; which is appropriate depends on the context and application
in question.
The diversity of notions of system equivalence shows up most clearly in the
process algebra community where we find, for example, traces or failures equiva-
lence, various flavours of bi-simulation as well as various forms of testing equiv-
alence.
4 Failures Equivalences
In an attempt to resolve the problems associated with drawing input/output dis-
tinctions as well as address the issue of non-deterministic systems, one of the
authors proposed a recasting of the Goguen/Meseguer formulation into CSP [18].
Again the notation is tweaked slightly from the original 1990 presentation to make
it more compatible with the rest of this paper.
 tr tr  tracesS 	 tr 
 tr refusalsStr  L  refusalsStr  L (2)
where tr 
 tr  tr   L  tr   L. Different refusals sets can result after a
given trace corresponding to different non-deterministic choices. The possible
non-determinism of the system S is thus allowed for in this definition. Abusing
notation, we take the distributed intersection of the refusal sets with L to get the
Low level view.
CSP does not draw a distinction between inputs and outputs, both are regarded
simply as ‘events’. There is a danger in wrongly categorising events as input
or output which is avoided, though arguably at the cost of a characterisation of
confidentiality that errs towards being too strong. A simple example serves to
illustrate this.
Consider a system with high and low inputs but only high outputs. Naively we
would regard such a system as secure and yet it could fail the CSP characterisation.
Whether or not this system really is secure depends critically on the semantics of
the term ‘input’. If ‘input’ is taken to mean an event wholly under the control of
the environment that cannot be refused or delayed by the system then we probably
would accept this system as being secure. However if there is any possibility of
the system influencing the occurrence (even if not the value) of the ‘input’ event
in any way we immediately have a channel from high to low. Any event that is
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wrongly characterised as an input in this sense could slip through and lead to a
system incorrectly being deemed secure.
The CSP approach is thus a much safer criterion but could lead to some secure
systems being rejected. If you are to draw such input/output distinctions and use
them in the definition of security then they must be precisely defined.
In fact it turns out that, although CSP doesn’t draw such distinctions, we can
nonetheless use the framework, given in Equation 2, to distinguish at least the
High (abstracted) input/output events.
This ability to distinguish inputs/outputs in CSP arises from our use of the
more symmetric formulation of [18] instead of the more traditional form in which
an arbitrary trace is compared to its purge. A consequence of this is that in this
formulation it is not guaranteed that the purge of an arbitrary trace is itself a valid
trace of the system. At first glance this appears to be a flaw as it seems to allow
Low to deduce in some cases the occurrence of certain events at the high level.
It actually turns out to be an advantage: the failure of the purge of a trace to be
a trace is due to the occurrence of high signal events, i.e. events that cannot be
refused or delayed by High. An example of such an event might be an alarm signal
to alert High of some low-level activity. This clearly does not constitute a flow
from High to Low and yet Low can deduce that such an alarm event has occurred.
For example, the process
S  l   h   l

  STOP
has traces fhi hli hl hi hl h l

ig. The purgeH of hl h li is hl li which is not a
trace of S. Thus when Low sees l

he knows h has occurred, but if High has no
control over the occurrence of h it does not provide a means for High to signal to
Low.
If we do not want h to be modelled as a signal event we should use the process
S  l   h   l

  STOP   l

  STOP
which allows High to refuse h without deadlocking the system. Now when Low
sees l

he cannot tell if h has occurred.
Using the purge formulation would be equivalent to assuming that all events
are refusable.
The issue of ‘input totality’ that was a concern for many of the early formula-
tions is another manifestation of this difficulty, i.e. the problem of what happens
if an invalid input sequence is presented to the system. This is dealt with automat-
ically in a CSP approach: invalid inputs are simply refused by the system.
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The approach of [18] deliberately tried to stay as close as possible to the spirit
of the original Goguen/Meseguer formulation. In particular it sticks to quantifying
over traces and comparison of the next events. It is interesting to consider how
one might alter it to cast it in a more conventional CSP style. Firstly rather than
just comparing next events we can compare the subsequent behaviours, i.e. assert
equivalence as processes and use the conventional CSP hiding operator rather than
having to use (distributed) set intersection:
 tr tr  tracesS 	 tr 
 tr Str   L failures Str   L (3)
where S   L is the projection of the set of failures of S to the set L: each failure
trA is projected to tr   LA  L.
In fact we can think of the earlier formulation as a kind of partial unwinding of
this. Thus we can perform an inductive proof that Equation 2 implies Equation 3.
It is also immediate that Equation 3 implies Equation 2, and hence that the two
equations give the same characterisation.
In order to avoid the need to explicitly quantify over traces we might try ex-
pressing a characterisation directly as a CSP equivalence:
S n H failures S k STOPH n H (4)
At first glance one might think that this is equivalent to Equation 3. Putting STOP
in parallel with S over the alphabet H has the effect of preventing all traces with
H events. We thus appear to be asserting that the process with all the H events
enabled is equivalent to that with H events prevented. In fact it differs in some
subtle but significant senses. Firstly this is really the purge formulation and so,
in particular, it implies that the purge of any trace is itself a trace. Furthermore,
the standard CSP semantics of such an equation asserts equality over stable states,
that is states that cannot perform any internal (i.e. high level) events. For any
state in which internal events can occur the refusal set might alter as the result
the occurrence of such these transitions. It is therefore rather hard to make sense
of the equality of refusal sets over unstable states, hence the decision to deal just
with stable states in the standard CSP semantics. The quantification of Equation 3
however does force equality for all traces, not just traces leading to stable states
(i.e. traces that can not be immediately extended by  events). Equation 3 is
therefore strictly stronger that Equation 4.
For example, the process
S  h   STOP   l   STOP u STOP
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meets Equation 4. On the other hand it fails Equation 3, since its failures after hi
are not the same as its failures after hhi, despite the low level views of both these
traces being the same.
It turns out that we can cast Equation 3 in a form resembling Equation 4 and
equivalent to it by using a different approach to concealing the High events. In
Equation 3 we have concealed them by the rather obvious device of simply hiding
them. An alternative is not to hide them but to camouflage them:
S jjj RUNH failures S k STOPH jjj RUNH (5)
Here we interleave the two systems with RUNH on the high level events. Now
whenever Low sees an H event he cannot tell if it was performed by S or by RUNH .
By avoiding the use of hiding we have side-stepped the restriction to stable states.
This form of abstraction was introduced by Roscoe et al [16], in which Equation 5
is shown to be equivalent to Equation 3.
The use of hiding to abstract certain events in this way provides us with an-
other way of modelling signal events. Roscoe et al refers to this form of abstrac-
tion as ‘eager’ to reflect the idea that events abstracted in this way are thought of as
occurring at the earliest opportunity. Correspondingly the interleaving abstraction
is referred to as ‘lazy’. These forms of abstraction have also been characterised in
a testing framework [21] which has the added advantage of allowing input/output
distinctions to be drawn over the low-level events as well as the high-level.
These abstractions and variants of them are discussed in detail in chapter 12
of [15].
5 Bisimulation
It is usual when presenting a notion of non-interference to also present a so-called
unwinding result. The idea is to present some constraints on the transitions of
the system that together are equivalent to, or at least imply, the original property.
Proving that a system obeys such constraints is more tractable than showing that
it satisfies the original property.
In accordance with this tradition [18] presents such unwinding rules for an
equivalence 
:
	 Rule 1:
YiYj  StatesS 	 Yi 
 Yj  RefusalsYi n H  RefusalsYj n H
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	 Rule 2:
YiYj  StatesS 	 Yi 
 Yj   e  InitialsYi tr 	 hei   L  tr   L
 Yihei 
 Yjtr
We have introduced an equivalence relation over states of the system. The first
rule asserts that for two equivalent states Low’s view of the possibilities for the
next step of the system is identical.
The second rule has the effect of ensuring that the equivalence is exactly that
induced by purging High events. That is, if we let Yi denote a state reached after
trace tri, then rule 2 implies: tri   L  trj   L  Yi 
 Yj.
Proving that these imply the original non-interference is a fairly straightfor-
ward induction style proof. Showing that these are also necessary is a bit more
delicate and this is proved in a rather cumbersome fashion in an appendix of [18].
A far more elegant and instructive proof of completeness can be obtained
by noticing that these rules bear a remarkable resemblance to a statement of bi-
simulation equivalence as used in process algebras.
In fact weak bi-simulation is subtly stronger than failures equivalence as it
insists on the bi-similarity of individual states and draws distinctions between
processes on the basis of where non-determinism is resolved. A simple example
(pictured in Figure 1) illustrates this:
P  a   b   STOP u a   c   STOP
Q  a   b   STOP u c   STOP
The non-deterministic choice is made earlier in P than in Q and as a result
it is easy to show that no bisimulation relation can be found for them. However
an environment that can only observe the a, b and c events cannot distinguish
between them. They are failures equivalent and testing equivalent.
Gardiner, [3], introduces the notion of a power bisimulation specifically to
address this point and constructs a bisimulation-style equivalence that is exactly
as discriminating as failures equivalence. [3] gives an elegant formulation and
proof in terms of predicate transformers.
In order to construct a suitable power bisimulation for pairs of processes aris-
ing in the definition of non-interference it appears to be necessary (or at least
convenient) to distinguish two distinct sources of non- determinism as observed
by Low.
Firstly we assume that the system S with the H events hidden and  (and L)
events considered visible (with the  events all distinguishable) is deterministic.
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Figure 1: Processes P and Q
Thus, after any two runs of S n H with the same L  fg projection the system
will end up in a pair of states for which the acceptance sets visible to Low will be
identical.
In effect we are assuming that there is no non-determinism due to ambiguous
visible (low) events and that all the non-determinism that low sees is due purely
to the  s when we subsequently hide them.
In the earlier version if this paper [19] we allowed the possibility that S n H
could itself manifest non-determinism and introduced the notion of loose-bisimulation
to handle this. This degree of generality seems unnecessary and assuming that
S n H is deterministic makes for a cleaner presentation. It also makes clearer
the link between this approach and that of Roscoe, Woodcock and Wulf, [16]. In
any case it is always possible to transform a system with non-determinism into a
(failures) equivalent one in which all the non-determinism is absorbed into the  s.
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In the following we will associate with every state s an acceptance set Initialss
that represents the set of events that the system will be prepared to participate in
if any of them is offered by the environment. It is thus the complement of the
maximal refusal set. When dealing with notions of bisimulation it is more conve-
nient to think in terms of acceptance sets rather than refusal sets. Two states that
are bisimilar will have the same initials as any event that can be performed in one
state must also be possible in the other state. Note also that it is more usual in CSP
to define such Initials only over the stable states. Here however it is convenient to
extend the notation to all states.
For a system that is deterministic the initials set is sufficient to define the
possible behaviours on the next step from a given state. When the system displays
non-determinism we will be dealing with sets of states S and so we will have a
corresponding set of acceptance sets that we denote AcceptSetS. Each element
of AcceptSetS is itself a set and will be the complement of the corresponding
refusal set associated with that state.
We now define a power bisimulation relation 
S induced by purging H’s and
 ’s:

S  ffS j S tr Sg fS j S tr
 
 Sg j tr tr  tracesS  tr   L  tr   Lg
and for a set of states S and a define hSia by:
hSia  fS  StatesS j  a  H 

 a H 

	 S a Sg
This can be interpreted as follows: given that the system is in a state from the set
S and that the event a has occurred, then the resulting state reached must be in the
set hSia.
We can then easily prove the following:
Lemma 5.1 If S n H is deterministic then it satisfies a power-bisimulation with
respect to 
S: in other words, given any two states S and S of S,
S


S S  hSia 
S hSia
 
We define the relation S on states of S induced by purging the H events (but
leaving L and  ’s).
S  fStr Str j tr tr  tracesS  tr   L  tr   Lg
where L

 L  fg
We can then further prove the following:
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Lemma 5.2 If S


S S then for all s  S there exists s  S such that s S s,
and vice versa.
 
Lemma 5.3
s

S s  AcceptSetLs  AcceptSetLs
 
where AcceptSetLs  AcceptSets   L. This follows immediately from the fact
that S n H is deterministic.
These two lemmas prove the following:
Lemma 5.4
S


S S  AcceptSetLS  AcceptSetLS
 
We have thus shown that a process that satisfies the assumption of being determin-
istic in its L and  alphabet satisfies the power-bisimulation property with respect
to the equivalence 
. We have further shown that such a process satisfies the
non-interference property formulated in terms of acceptance sets. This is subtly
different and slightly stronger that the failures formulation in that it requires the
acceptance sets to match exactly. For failures equivalence the subset closure of
the refusal sets is automatically taken, which can mask certain distinctions. For
most purposes the failures semantics is appropriate, as the only way that the en-
vironment can probe the system is by offering events and seeing whether or not
one of them is accepted. However, if there is some more direct way to observe the
acceptance sets, for example if the system simply displays lights corresponding to
which events are available, then the acceptance sets semantics is appropriate. The
acceptance sets formulation is safer: the set of systems that it will deem insecure
is a superset of those using the failures formulation.
It is worth examining this result more carefully. We see that there are two
sources of potential non-determinism in Low’s view: High’s activity and the oc-
currence of  events. We are in effect asserting that for a non-interfering system
all of the non-determinism that Low sees is attributable to the internal  activity.
Furthermore we see that a corollary of the determinism of S n H is that High is
non-interfering with the  ’s, i.e. High cannot influence the occurrence of  events.
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We will see the significance of this observation when we discuss the interaction
of flavours of non-determinism in Section 6.
We can think of the  s as encoding the internal sources of non- determinism,
for example due to a scheduler or even due to the output of a stream cipher.
To return to our simple example of Figure 1, we see that the power-bisimulation
relation:
f fPg 
 fQg fP

P

g 
 fQQ

Q

g fP

g 
 fQ

g fP

g 
 fQ

gg
establishes the power-bisimilarity of P and Q above.
In [3] Gardiner provides constructions for power-bisimulations giving pre-
cisely the same discrimination as the equivalences of the traces, failures and ac-
ceptance sets semantics. The power-bisimulation relation constructed above for
processes that are deterministic in their L/ alphabets corresponds to that of Gar-
diner for the acceptance model and so we can immediately deduce the complete-
ness of unwinding rules formulated as a power-bisimulation. The proof of this
correspondence and further discussion of the traces and failures formulation will
be given in a forthcoming paper.
The relevance of the notions of bisimulation to defining confidentiality was
proposed by Foccardi and Gorrieri in, for example, [2], apparently without refer-
ence to analogies with unwinding. The use of the notion of power-bisimulation in
security is, to our knowledge, new.
5.1 Composability
McCullough [9] was the first to consider composability issues: whether non-
interference properties in the presence of non-determinism were preserved un-
der various forms of composition. He proposed a generalisation of the original
Goguen and Meseguer formulation to try to account for non-determinism but
found that it failed to be compositional with respect to a certain composition,
somewhat akin to CSP parallel. This prompted him to propose a new property
(restrictiveness) precisely to obtain composability.
[18] contains proofs of the composability of the formulation of non-interference
considered above with respect to various CSP operators.
Note however that composability depends on the property and the operators
in question. The property of determinacy, for example, defined by Milner in
[12] turns out not to be composable with respect to all the CCS operators, which
prompts him to introduce the closely associated concept of confluence, which is.
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Again there appear to be analogies here with some of the quests for composability
in the security community and indeed confluence appears to bear some resem-
blance to the notion of forward correctability. The details of the correspondence
are complex however and will not be addressed here.
6 Testing
A testing approach to non-interference will consider information to pass from the
high level to the low level of a system if tests purely on the low level can enable
some deductions to be made about what is occurring at the high level. There are
different ways in which this may be formulated, depending on the power of the
tests and what constitutes success of a test. It turns out that three formulations of
flavours of non-interference can be given testing characterisations.
6.1 Non-deducibility
Sutherland’s theory of non-deducibility, [23] characterises the lack of information
flow in terms of an inability to deduce anything about high level behaviour from
a low level view. A system M is said to exhibit this property if every low level
view tr of an system execution is compatible with every high level view of inputs
tr (in the sense that there is some execution tr which presents both views). This
captures the idea that no high-level behaviour can be ruled out by any low-level
observation. It is described in process-algebraic terms as follows:
 tr  tracesM   L tr  tracesM   HI tr  tracesM 	
tr   L  tr  tr   HI  tr (6)
This is slightly different to the original definition, which was given in a syn-
chronous framework (so all inputs and outputs occur together on every step), but
it is the equivalent characterisation in an asynchronous setting.
It may also be characterised in a testing framework. A low level user may be
considered as testing the system, attempting to elicit information concerning the
high level inputs. Thus for non-deducibility to be present, such a low level user
should not be able to rule out any possibility for tr   HI—the low level behaviour
should be compatible with any high level user inputs.
Suppose that the test T has an alphabet L, and some distinguished SUCCESS
states. A process may pass a test if there is some execution of the process together
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with the test which may reach a success state. A process P with its own success
states may pass a test T through a system M if there is some execution of P k M k
T in which both P and T may reach a success state.
Then a system M exhibits non-deducibility if no test T through M may differ-
entiate any two high level users U and U (drawn from the space of all possible
high level users) which have alphabet HI, whose traces are only those of M re-
stricted to HI, and which have some success states.
The restriction to alphabet HI corresponds to the requirement that any low
level information is required to be compatible only with any sequence of high level
inputs. This means essentially that no information at the low level is available
about the high level input to the system—it is all masked by the system S. In other
words, for any test T and any two high level users U and U, U jHI j S may
pass T if and only if U jH j S may pass T .
In the state machine formulations of the original definitions, all processes must
always be able to accept any input values and provide outputs. This characterises
an important subclass of CSP processes. If the space of high level users is re-
stricted to such processes, then the testing formulation is equivalent to Suther-
land’s. However, CSP allows the consideration of more general classes of process
if appropriate.
For example, the system
S  inhx   outl  S u outl  S (7)
apparently passes no information from high to low. However, the high level pro-
cess STOP can be distinguished from inh   STOP because a low level test will
receive an output when the second is tested, but not when the first is tested. It
depends whether STOP is considered a valid description of a high level user or
not as to whether S is considered to permit information flow. The characterisation
is thus dependent on the space of processes over which the high level users U can
range—the kind of activity which must be indistinguishable.
It is observed in [24] that Sutherland’s definition has some unwanted conse-
quences. A system meeting this property still permits a high level user to com-
municate information to a low level user, essentially because high level outputs
(which are ignored in the definition) may have a bearing on later high level in-
puts. It is instructive to recast their example in CSP terms. The system Mk

 k


is parametrised by two one-bit keys k

and k

. It takes a high level input hi, and
offers a high level output ho and a low level output l. On a high level input x of
 or , it outputs that value xor’ed with the key k

. Both keys are then randomly
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reset. On any other high level input (the original example uses a special value q)
the second key k

is output to the low level and randomly reset, and the first key
k

is output to the high level.
Mk

 k

  hix   if x  f g
then ho  lx k 
uk
 
k

fg
Mk

 k


else hok   lk  uk

fg
Mk

 k


It is easily checked that this system allows any high level inputs with any low
level view, and hence M exhibits non-deducibility.
However, a high level user can use this system to communicate to the low
level, by employing a particular strategy. If the high level wishes to transmit a
particular bit b, then he first learns the value of k

by inputting q, and then inputs
k

 b, which will result in the transmission of b to the low level. Based on this, a
transmitter wishing to communicate a sequence hbiau of bits behaves as follows:
Thbia u  hiq   hok   hik b  hok   Tu
The CSP formulation in terms of HI draws attention to the weak point of
Sutherland’s definition. The only high level activity it is concerned with is high
level input. However, high level users also interact with the system by receiving
output, and in this case the output received can influence later input. Thus the
definition does not capture all the ways in which the high level user can interact
with the system.
The example of [24] can be replaced with a rather more intuitive and immedi-
ate example that we believe shows up the essence of the problem.
Consider a system in which high level data is encrypted and the encrypted
form transmitted over a low channel. Thus far we have the classic scenario that
arises in many security architectures and yet has proved so difficult to capture in a
non-interference style framework. Assuming that the encryption scheme is itself
‘secure’ (in a cryptanalytic sense) then we would tend to accept that such a system
is secure.
Suppose now that the high user can in fact observe or predict the key stream
before he submits his plain-text for encryption. We can easily imagine this occur-
ring in a number of ways and in fact Wittbold et al’s example achieves essentially
this. Then High can modify the plain-text in such a way as to communicate it to
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Low, in particular he can simply xor the predicted bits into the plain-text before
submitting it to the encryption resulting in raw plain-text being broadcast over the
low channel.
This is not too surprising so far but let us examine it more closely as it is
a pointer to the root of the problem. The example involves two kinds of non-
determinism: external (under the control of the users or processes, in particular
High) and probabilistic, arising, in this case, from the cipher stream. In the above
example we have allowed these to interact: we have allowed High to resolve his
non-determinism basing his decisions on observations of how the probabilistic
non-determinism is being resolved. If we were to force High to resolve all his non-
determinism at the outset, before any of the cipher stream has been generated, or
in the absence of any knowledge of this source of non-determinism, then he could
not exploit this channel.
We see that this discussion touches on the points made earlier regarding the
loose-bisimulation. The loose- bisimulation property implied that High should
not be able to interfere with the  events. If we can think of the  events as rep-
resenting the non-determinism associated with the cipher stream then we see that
this is asserting that High cannot interfere with the cipher stream. The situation
is a little delicate as the bisimulation does not prevent flow from the  ’s to High
which potentially could allow the scenario described above. In fact High xor’ing
the cipher stream to the data stream is tantamount to interfering with the stream
but it is not immediately clear that this has been formally captured. This will be a
topic for further investigation. An obvious solution is to also require that the  ’s
do not interfere with High but this seems a bit heavy handed. It would however
be perfectly reasonable where the  s represent the output of a stream cipher for
example.
Constructing semantic models for a process algebra to accurately capture the
distinction between the various forms of non-determinism has proved difficult. A
number of probabilistic process algebras have been proposed, for example Morgan
[10] and Lowe [7]. These assume that non-determinism is resolved at the outset
and so do not allow for the possibility of delaying choices and making decisions
on the basis of observations of how non-deterministic choices are resolved ‘at
run time’. We thus see why it has proved so difficult to model this scenario in a
non-interference style.
Currently we do not appear to have theories rich enough to fully capture the
distinction between the various flavours of non-determinism. Indeed it is not clear
that it would be particularly effective to try to develop and apply such extended
theories as the greater complexity would probably render them unusable. For the
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crypto example at least it would seem more effective to use arguments outside
the model to establish that the crypto is wholly independent of the rest of the
system. In fact a well designed crypto device appropriately incorporated in a
secure architecture will have precisely these characteristics: the cipher stream will
be unobservable and unpredictable by High (or indeed any other user or process).
High may of course be able to deduce the cipher stream after the event if he can
observe the cipher-text stream but, crucially, this is too late to exploit. Furthermore
an ideal encryption algorithm will have the property that observing an arbitrary
length of the stream should not enable further bits to be predicted, i.e. the stream
is effectively random. We of course have to take care that any implementations
maintain these assumptions. Conventional refinement techniques will not preserve
the non-determinism so from a refinement point of view this non-determinism has
to be handled differently.
Such a situation is not entirely satisfactory but appears quite workable, at least
for a large class of systems. Of course it might be that we encounter systems
which are secure but for which the flavours of non-determinism cannot be so con-
veniently isolated. This could probably be regarded as a symptom of a poorly
designed system.
6.2 Non-deducibility on strategies
To avoid the problem with non-deducibility outlined in the previous section, the
notion of non-deducibility on strategies was introduced [24]. In this formulation,
any low view needs to be compatible with any high transmitter strategy, where a
strategy describes what a high level user will input depending on previous inputs
and outputs. Any low level trace view should thus be compatible with any high
level view that is possible for the system. In testing terms, a strategy will be a
high-level user U, and a system S will provide non-deducibility on strategies if for
any test T and any two high level users U and U meeting the same restrictions
as previously, U jH j S may pass T if and only if U jH j S may pass T .
This is equivalent to a simple variation on Equation 6:
 tr  tracesS   L tr  tracesS   H tr  tracesS 	
tr   L  tr  tr   H  tr (8)
(Note that the example Mk

 k

 above does not have this property.)
This definition incorporates all possible high level interactions between the
system and the high level users, because they can interact on the entire high level
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interface H and not simply on HI as in Equation 6. This means essentially that no
information at the low level is available about any high level activity of the system
at all.
The nature of the possible high level users (or strategies) affects whether or not
a system meets this definition. For example, when high level users are restricted
to the subclass of non-deterministic state machines (which alternate on inputs and
outputs for ever), then the system S of Equation 7 meets the definition. However,
if U can range over all possible CSP processes, then S does not meet the definition:
a low level user could distinguish between STOP and inh   STOP. The high
level users permitted will depend on the nature of the situation being modelled: if
high level users must always provide input when requested, then considering the
users to range over such a subclass would be appropriate.
It is immediate that in the testing formulation Equation 8 implies Equation 6:
if a test distinguishes the inputs of two high level users, then the same test will
distinguish their high level activity.
6.3 Noninference
Noninference (see e.g. [13]) is a weaker property than the two previously consid-
ered. Rather than require any low level view to be compatible with any high level
activity, it simply requires that the low level view of any execution must be com-
patible with no activity at all at the high level. Hence it must always be possible
to elicit the low level activity even if there is no high level activity at all. This
property follows immediately from both of those given above: if a low level trace
is compatible with any high level trace (either on just high-level inputs, or on all
high level events), then it must be compatible with the high-level empty trace.
This is expressed as follows:
 tr  tracesS 	 tr   L  tracesS (9)
The equivalent formulation in testing terminology gives some insight into the
nature of non-inference. The testing characterisations of non-deducibility and
non-deducibility on strategies permitted the high level user (as well as the test)
some control over when a successful state is reached. If this capability is removed,
then success is dependent entirely on the state of the testing process T (i.e.  is
not in the alphabet of any of the U processes). Non-interference for S can still be
viewed as the requirement that U jH j S may pass T if and only if U jH j S
may pass T , but the notion of success is independent of the state that the U and
U processes might have reached.
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It turns out that this formulation is equivalent to non-inference. Assume first
that S meets Equation 9. Given U and U, assume without loss of generality that
U k S may pass T . Then there is some trace tr of U k S k T that takes T to a
success state. Now tr  tracesS, and so tr   L  tracesS. Since hi  tracesU,
it follows that tr   L is a trace of U k S k T . Thus T can reach the same success
state when testing U k S, and hence U k S may pass T . Thus no two high level
users can be distinguished by any low level may test T .
Assume now that S meets the testing characterisation. Given a trace tr of S,
there is a test T that succeeds only after performing tr   L, and a high level user U
that can perform tr   H. Thus U k S may pass T . Hence STOPH k S may pass T ,
so there is some trace tr of STOPH k S which takes T to a success state. Hence
tr   L  tr   L, and tr   H  hi, since STOPH blocks all high level events.
Hence tr  tr   L, and so tr   L is a trace of S.
In fact, it also turns out that S in conjunction with any high level user must
give rise to the same set of low level traces: that U k S n H should give the
same (low level) traces whatever high level process H is used.
6.4 A deterministic approach to Non-interference
An alternative definition of non-interference in the process algebra context was
proposed by Roscoe, Woodcock and Wulf [16]. In their approach, a system S
does not allow information flow from high to low if the system
AbstractHCHAOSH k S (10)
is deterministic. AbstractH denotes an appropriate abstraction of the H events to
obtain a Low view of the system. Typically it will involve a mix of lazy and eager
abstraction depending on whether the high events are considered delayable on not.
This system presents events only at the low level, and its determinism means that
there is only one possibility for each event at any stage (offer, or refusal), however
the non-determinism in the system is resolved. Since any high level user will be a
refinement of CHAOSH , and since all CSP operators preserve the refinement rela-
tion, this means that any particular high level user UH in parallel with the system
will have to be a refinement of CHAOSH is parallel with the system. Since the
result (when H is hidden) is already deterministic, this means that it cannot be
further refined so it must remain unchanged. This is true for any high level user
UH, so all possible high level users must give the same result at the low level.
Hence, no low level test can distinguish between them. It follows that this formu-
lation implies non-deducibility on strategies. In a sense, CHAOSH embodies all
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possible strategies, and the requirement that the resulting system is deterministic
states that all such strategies must always give the same result.
Advantages of this approach are that it side-steps much of the debate about
what is the appropriate notion of process equivalence, since virtually all the pro-
cess algebras agree on what processes are deterministic. It is compositional, it is
preserved by conventional refinement and it is automatically checkable (using for
example using the built-in determinism checking facility of FDR).
It is clear that where it can be applied this is an extremely effective charac-
terisation of absence of information flow. The drawback is that there appears to
be a large class of systems for which this property is too strong: for which some
degree of low-level non-determinism is unavoidable. Perhaps such systems are
best handled by isolating such ‘essential’ non-determinism and showing that the
property is preserved by refinement of the rest of the system.
An example will be instructive:
S  inhx   STOP jjj outl  STOP u outl  STOP
As it stands, this system does not allow information to flow from the high to the
low level. It meets all of the characterisations of non-interference covered in this
paper, except for the deterministic one.
Information will not flow from the high to the low level if the non-determinism
in the system is essential, and cannot be removed or subverted in some way, (per-
haps by a poor implementation of random choice). However, different runs with
the same high level user (say inh   STOP) can result in a number of different
possible low level behaviours. Thus S system does not meet definition 10, since it
is non-deterministic at the low level.
However, if the system S can be refined when it is implemented, then it is not
clear that the resulting system will retain the non-interference properties required.
For example, the process
S  outl  inhx   STOP   inhx   outl  STOP
is a refinement of S above. However, S does not provide non-inference, let
along non-deducibility or non-deducibility on strategies. For example, the trace
hinh  outl i is possible for S, but houtl i is not. The value on the low level
output provides information about whether the high level input has occurred.
If we are dealing with such a situation, where the non-determinism in the sys-
tem is not guaranteed to all be retained, or where there is some doubt over its even-
tual form when the system is implemented, then a definition of non-interference
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which allows some measure of refinement will be useful. In this case defini-
tion 10 is useful, since it is preserved by refinement: any refinement of S will have
to result in a refinement of AbstractHCHAOSH k S, which must therefore be
deterministic.
Another characterisation of information flow which allows non-interference
to be preserved by refinement is proposed in [8], where Lowe introduces a notion
of capturing information flow. His definition is weaker than the deterministic
characterisation, though it is also preserved by (a restricted form of) refinement.
Lowe states that there is absence of information flow if no ‘consistent’ way of
resolving the internal choices in the system can allow information to flow from
high to low in Ryan’s sense. In the example S above, Lowe’s approach will not
allow the resolution of the internal choice to depend on the occurrence of the high
level input, since there is no causal relationship between the occurrence of that
input and the occurrence of the outputs. Hence such a refinement will not be
permitted. This requires an extension to the CSP semantics, essentially to model
true concurrency.
On the other hand, if the random choices in S can be guaranteed to be retained,
we might say that the non-determinism in the system is essential. In this case
refinement of S is not a concern and the CSP formulation of non-deducibility on
strategies is sufficient to establish a lack of information flow.
It may be that we can establish a link between the determinism approach and
the power-bisimulation approach presented in Section 5. If we think of all the
non-determinism observed by Low as resulting from different  activities then
we could assert that to be non-interfering an abstraction of the system that ob-
scures the High events but retains the  ’s should be deterministic. This would
have many of the advantages of the deterministic approach whilst allowing some
non-determinism to manifest itself in Low’s view, allowing for example the en-
crypted channel examples.
The difficulty is that  ’s are not really part of the standard CSP framework
and that further non-determinism could arise from ambiguous  transitions: two
distinct transitions from a given state that are both labelled by a  . Both of these
problems can addressed by not labelling them as  events but simply regarding
them as another set of events hidden from Low and disjoint from High.
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7 Generalisations of Non-interference
7.1 Motivation
The idea of non-interference is clearly a central one in information security. It is
however often argued that in practice it is too strong, that no real policy ever calls
for total absence of information flow over any channel and that in any case it is
not achievable. For example even the so-called one-way regulators in fact allow
for a very low bandwidth feedback from high to low to regulate the upward flow
and prevent buffer overflows etc.
Even for the comparatively straightforward MLS style policies simple non-
interference runs into problems, for example the encryption problem discussed
earlier and the need to incorporate downgrades.
As information processing systems steadily grow more sophisticated and dis-
tributed the old paper world analogies look increasingly dated. The demand for se-
curity in the commercial sector as well as trends in the military sector are prompt-
ing the need for more flexible policies, with a finer granularity of objects and more
subtle controls of flows. New paradigms like object orientation, hypertext, virtual
machines, mobile code and agents etc allow a far greater granularity of objects
to be considered as the elements of a security policy. More sophisticated styles
of policy often call for history or location based access decisions and these again
cannot be reduced to predicates on the classification labels of individual events or
interfaces.
All of these suggests the need to investigate ways in which we might generalise
non-interference to allow for partial, conditional flows etc.
7.2 Formalisation
We use as our starting point the formulation given in Section 3. The most liberal
generalisation of this appears to be:
 tr tr  tracesS 	 (11)
tr 
 tr  AbsHS k Constraintr  AbsHS k Constraintr
where AbsH denotes an appropriate form of abstraction to model the low-level
view. We have a number of abstraction operators available to us, for example the
various flavours of lazy and eager hiding. Another abstraction that has been used
in formalising notions of anonymity but hitherto not confidentiality is ‘projection’,
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renaming a set of events to a single event. We will see later how this operator
is useful in addressing the encryption problem. These abstractions can be used
selectively across the alphabet of the system, i.e. we might want to abstract certain
events that we think of a signal events eagerly whilst other we abstract lazily.

 denotes an equivalence relation between behaviours. Hitherto this has typ-
ically been defined in terms of some kind of purge function on traces but there
seems to be no reason to restrict ourselves to such equivalences.
 denotes an appropriate process equivalence. Which is appropriate depends
on the system and policy in question but failures or testing equivalence would
seem most likely. In particular using a testing equivalence framework makes it
possible to tailor the class of tests to the system and policy in question.
‘Constrain’ defines a set of high-level behaviours for which we wish to restrict
the flow of information. The influence of behaviours of S that fall outside this
envelope on the low-level will be unconstrained by Equation 11. We are regarding
them as innocuous and we do not care how they interfere with Low. Presumably
a policy might be formulated as the complement of this: stating what behaviours
must not interfere, in which case Constrain might not itself be a process, i.e. might
not satisfy the closure axioms for a process. How useful a degree of freedom this
represents is unclear without trying it out against a sample of policies but we have
included it for completeness.
A policy might be encoded as the conjunction of a set of equations of the form
of Equation 11.
We can see how various forms of partial or constrained non-interference could
be captured in this way. Such a formulation allows Low to determine High’s
behaviour up to the
 equivalence. That is, Low can determine which equivalence
class High’s behaviour belongs to but not where it lies within that class. We can
thus define partial information flows and indeed we can arrange to have ‘non-
transitive partial flows’: for which information flows from A to B and from B to C
yet none flows from A to C.
Consider a data space that can be covered by the coordinates x y. Our A   B
projection loses the y information so projects to x y, for some arbitrary y. The
B   C projection loses the x information so we get x y   x y. Putting
these two projections together one after the other then gives a projection A   C 
x y  x y, i.e. loss of all information about the original point in the A space.
This example is a bit simplistic as one could easily capture it in a simple la-
belling formulation. It does serve to illustrate the idea and one can easily construct
something more elaborate. A more realistic instance would be a policy that allows
for automatic downgrading of certain statistical information from a data base.
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Another example in which a more general notion of equivalence seems appro-
priate is where we consider a high level process editing a file. In general many
edit sequences could result in the same final text (we are assuming here that the
editor is such that all the details of changes are forgotten and only the final re-
sulting text retained, i.e. there is no mark-up facility). We thus want to regard all
edit sequences resulting in the same final text as equivalent. Here again the idea
of confluence crops up: that different sequences of actions give rise to equivalent
states, in particular that certain pairs of actions may be commutative. Thus we
might define an equivalence on traces with respect to certain permutation groups
on actions.
Another possibility is to use a formulation with High processes rather than
High traces, requiring that for any two high level processes U

and U

:
U

 U

 AbsHS k U k Constrain  AbsHS k U k Constrain
where  denotes a suitable equivalence over High processes.
Turning now to the problem of modelling high-level data being encrypted and
send out over a low-level channel. Suppose that we take 
 to be defined by:
tr 
 tr  tr   H  tr   H
and for our abstraction on the encrypted channel we rename the 0’s and 1’s of the
enciphered stream to * say. Then we see that L can figure out the length but not
the content of the H string. This would appear to accurately model the encrypted
channel scenario. We have of course to carefully justify the projection on the
cipher channel, presumably using cryptanalytic arguments.
There remains an issue of how to capture the effect of breaches of the crypto
system in such a framework, particularly the retrospective effect (previously con-
cealed information is revealed). This remains an open issue, though it does appear
to bear a curious resemblance to the downgrading problem, discussed in the next
section.
Alternative approaches to the encryption problem suggest themselves. One is
to think in terms of ensembles of possible experiments, or tests, that Low might
attempt. We can them compare the ensemble of all possible outcomes of such
experiments for two different High-level input streams of length n. We assume
that for each run of the experiment a fresh, random cipher stream is generated.
For a truly secure channel these will be the same in both cases, i.e. Low will get
the set of all possible bit streams of length n in both cases.
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Another issue is the fact that Low can test for equality of cipher streams even
if the streams themselves are meaningless to him. The situation has analogies with
the notion of data-independence with equality testing. A process is said to exhibit
such data-independence in a given data-type if the only operation the process can
perform on variables in the data type is equality testing. Thus the absolute values
of variables in the data-type are irrelevant. From Lows point of view a system
with a secure encryption over a channel visible to him can be thought of as being
having data-independence with equality testing in the data type of that channel.
A recent paper by Lazic´ and Nowak [6] gives a semantic definition of the
concept of data-independence with equality testing that could be applied to the
encryption problem. In essence we are seeking a notion of process equivalence
up to isomorphism, or more precisely in this case up to renaming of events of the
appropriate type. This will be discussed more fully in a forthcoming paper.
Notice also that the notion of confidentiality introduced in this example ap-
pears to be analogous to some of the notions of anonymity introduced in, for
example, [22]. Here of course we are thinking of anonymity over a message space
rather than an agent space.
7.3 Non-transitive non-interference
Another class of application that is amenable to this approach is that of so-called
non-transitive non-interference and channel control policies addressed by Rushby
in [17] . A couple of examples are presented for motivation: downgrading and
a crypto device. The essence of the problem appears to be that though we want
to allow flow from H to L it must be regulated, or at the very least audited, by
an intermediary. Thus if a high-level data item is to be downgraded and issued to
Low this can only happen if accompanied by appropriate actions by a Downgrader
process. Similarly high-level data should only be passed to a low-level channel
via the crypto device.
Rushby captures this by introducing a more elaborate purge function that,
rather than acting in a purely pointwise fashion on the traces, takes account of
the affect of downgrade events on the security labels of high events. Clearly we
can capture such a policy in our framework with a suitable choice of equivalence,
in particular that induced by Rushby’s ‘ipurge’ will do. However we could en-
visage capturing different forms of intransitive policies to those considered by
Rushby by exploiting the full generality of the equivalence 
 of Equation 11.
A later paper by Pinsky [14] presents an algorithm to construct, where it exists,
a minimal equivalence and associated unwinding rule for a downgrading policy.
30
The details are quite complex but it does appear that the algorithm presented by
Pinsky can be thought of as an algorithm to construct the appropriate bisimulation
relation. Indeed it seems probable that many of the unwinding results presented
in the security literature can be interpreted in this way. A number of algorithms
for establishing bisimulation relations between putatively equivalent processes are
known in the process algebra community and it is probable that they could be
usefully applied in the security context.
Note that for a policy encoded in Equation 11 the equivalence relation used
can be used to induce a (power) bisimulation relation so establishing an unwinding
result. Similarly the composability of such a property follows directly from the
composability of the process equivalence.
8 Conclusions/Discussion
The central thesis of this paper is that the problem of formalising the notion of
confidentiality boils down to that of formalising the equivalence of processes.
The latter is a central and difficult question at the heart of computer science to
which there is no unique answer. Which notion of equivalence is appropriate de-
pends on the context and application. Consequently we should not be surprised
that the information security community has failed to come up with a consensus
on which constitutes confidentiality. Indeed, in this paper we have shown a close
correspondence between various proposals for definitions of confidentiality in the
security literature and forms of process equivalence in the process algebra litera-
ture. Where the system’s security can be characterised as the determinism of the
low-level view we are in better shape as the definition of determinism is fairly
uncontroversial. It is not currently clear how large a class of real systems can be
handled in this way.
Viewing security from a process algebraic framework brings with it a number
of ready-made results and insights, particularly regarding composition and un-
winding. It also helps to pin-point and isolate the source of many of the problems
that have been encountered in the security literature, for example regarding the
encryption problem, the lack of compositionality of certain formulations etc.
The usefulness of the concept of testing equivalence has also emerged for this
viewpoint. This concept seems to have been curiously neglected in the context
of defining non-interference though it has recently been used in the analysis of
security protocols, see for example Abadi and Gordon, [1]. The philosophy is
strikingly similar: in [1] tests can be understood as encapsulating all possible at-
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tacks, and equivalence under testing establishes that no such attack can succeed in
distinguishing a real system from an ideal one. In our context, tests might be un-
derstood as encapsulating all possible ways in which information may flow from
high to low, either as a result of High attempting to communicate information,
or from the point of view of Low attempting to elicit it, or indeed involving some
collusion. Equivalence under testing establishes that no such strategy can succeed.
It seems very natural to think of two systems as being equivalent if no test can
distinguish them. Of course the problem then becomes one of what class of tests is
appropriate. In particular the generalised notion of testing introduced in [21] may
prove useful in drawing a distinction between delayable and undelayable events
at the low-level.
Furthermore we have shown the significance of the notion of power-bisimulation.
It establishes a correspondence between the testing, bisimulation and denotational
styles of defining process equivalence.
We have proposed a generalised form of non-interference and shown that it can
encompass a number of systems and policies of interest: with encrypted channels,
partial, statistical and conditional flows, downgraders etc.
We have only addressed the so-called ‘possibilistic’ notions of non-interference,
i.e. whether High can influence the possibility of Low performing certain observa-
tions. In other words we are abstracting away from issues of probability and time,
in particular. Clearly these are important and need to be addressed. However it
is also clear that even in the comparatively simple context of possibilistic models
there are many subtleties lurking. We hope that this paper has served to identify
and shed some more light on these subtleties.
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